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GARRISON COMMANDERS--IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE

BY

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(Cont.)		

interviews with more than 120 personnel at installation, MACOM, DA, and DOD levels. In addition, key personnel were interviewed from selected Air Force and Navy installations as well as a civilian city government to provide a basis of comparison for the assessment.

It is concluded that while some Army installations are being managed in an outstanding manner from the standpoint of both efficiency and effectiveness, they are the exception rather than the rule. Successful Garrison Commanders achieve their results in spite of, not because of, layers of bureaucracy, regulations and policies at all organizational levels. They are risk takers who rely on initiative, entrepreneurship, dedication and professionalism of their subordinates to achieve results.

The Standard Installation Organization, while well intentioned, has not been accepted throughout the Army. Commanders generally applauded it as a great effort, but felt that too many differences existed between individual installations and their missions. Standardization is perceived as serving to tie the commander's hand and restricting his ability to command his installation.

It is further concluded that because of the reactive mode in which most installation staffs operate, not enough attention is paid to mobilization and transition to war planning, and consequently installations are not well prepared to execute these vital missions. Furthermore, the actual resourcing of personnel, equipment, and facilities in support of mobilization and transition to war is minimal to nonexistent, leaving installations to do the best they can with on-hand assets for mobilization training and real-world contingencies.

Unclassified

# **USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER**

## **GARRISON COMMANDERS--IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE**

### **A GROUP STUDY PROJECT**

**by**

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**23 March 1987**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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## PREFACE

This paper follows two other military student papers: a Master's thesis prepared by three Army officers at the Naval Post Graduate School titled Excellence in the Combat Arms and a group study project published in 1986 by four Army officers at the U.S. Army War College titled Excellence in Brigades. It was produced under the aegis of the US Army War College Department of Command, Leadership and Management (DCLM) and received encouragement from the Office of the Comptroller of the Army. The conclusions reached by the authors are based upon their independent research, non-attributable interviews and personal experiences in installation management. For the purpose of this study the word Installation Commander is used in the same context as Community Commander (USAREUR) and the term Garrison Commander (CONUS) is used in the same context as the Deputy Community Commander (USAREUR) and the Support Group Commander (Korea). The latter refers to the individual who supervises the base operations activities (DKH, DPCA, DOL, DPTM, etc.).

The authors of this group study project are members of the US Army War College Class of 1987 and were asked to conduct the study based upon their backgrounds in installation management. They include a mix of active and reserve component military officers and a Department of the Army civilian. The authors are grateful to the following organizations and individuals for the assistance they provided in support of this study: LTC (P) Wolf D. Kutter, faculty adviser; Mr. Bob Stone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations); COL Don Barber, Installation Management Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Army; and the commanders and staffs of the major commands and installations visited. Without their input this study would not have been possible.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

In their best selling book In Search of Excellence, Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman discussed eight basic principles of management excellence which they found to exist in some of the most successful corporations operating in the world today. As the book explains, these eight "pillars of excellence" were developed as the result of an exhaustive study of dozens of organizations, both successful and unsuccessful, throughout many industries including the military. They suggested that their eight pillars have universal applicability to any organization seeking to optimize its performance. It is within this context that Garrison Commanders--In Search of Excellence was written.

Military installations exist to do three things: (1) house military organizations (2) provide training facilities and essential services to the soldiers, sailors and airmen and their families who are assigned to those installations and (3) provide a base from which to transition from peace to war. The operation of these installations in the Army consumes more than nine billion dollars annually (more than 10% of the total Army budget) in an environment of constrained dollar and manpower resources.

This paper assesses how well Garrison Commanders are doing their job and the degree to which the eight pillars of excellence

exist in the garrison environment. Does the structure support the concept of having both a Garrison Commander and a Chief of Staff? Do policies and regulations written by higher headquarters support or constrain the Garrison Commander? Is the Garrison Commander really a commander or more of a "Chief of Staff for Base Operations"? What do successful Garrison Commanders do differently than those who are not so successful? These are the kinds of issues which were examined in developing this paper. In addition, the ability of the peacetime installation to make the transition from peace to war was evaluated.

Much of the data used to make the assessment was gathered from personal interviews of key installation management personnel assigned throughout the world. A listing of those installations which were studied is contained in Appendix 1. In addition, a thorough search was made of existing literature on the subject of installation management including literature on how high performing towns and cities are structured and operated. Finally, the personal experiences of the authors played a role in the development of conclusions and recommendations. This paper is not intended to present masses of analytical data but rather to present the reader with a perspective of what is happening at the installation level throughout the Army. This perspective will hopefully serve as a catalyst to initiate some much needed changes in the way the Army goes about its day to day business of running installations.

There are numerous references in this paper to the Model Installation Program (MIP) and the Standard Installation Organization (SIO). The MIP program was universally acclaimed by those interviewed as perhaps the greatest innovation ever in installation management. The SIO, on the other hand, was probably the most misunderstood and widely condemned topic discussed. Each of these topics are discussed in more detail throughout the paper. The final chapter presents conclusions and recommendations. It is the belief of the authors that Army installations are, in general, fairly well run. But like anything else, management of installations varies with the competence, drive and leadership of the Installation and Garrison Commanders. Clearly, some installations are run better than others and these excellent installations were the focus of more detailed study. Many systemic problems have been highlighted which exist throughout the Army. In the final analysis, though, the potential savings and efficiencies attainable at the installation level should impell the Army to do whatever possible to unleash the creative, managerial potential of its installation managers and workers to generate the most service and support possible for each defense dollar spent.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **A BIAS FOR ACTION**

**Successful Garrison Commanders** are aggressive in their pursuit of excellence. This comes regardless of the guidance and direction (or lack thereof) from above. Normal bureaucratic stumbling blocks are either removed, circumvented or overcome. The bureaucratic mindset says that if the regulation doesn't say you can do it, then you had better get permission from higher authority. The "Bias for Action" mindset says that if the regulation doesn't say you can't do it, and you think it's a good idea, then do it! If the people who write the regulations meant to say you can't do it, then the regulations would say you can't do it. Low performing installations were staffed by people who (1) were hesitant to make a tough decision, (2) usually passed the action up the chain of command for a decision and (3) were led by people who did not encourage innovation. For example, in the Model Installation Program (MIP), nearly a third of MIP initiatives forwarded to higher headquarters for approval could have been approved at the installation level. Garrison Commanders and key managers were comfortable with the status quo and expressed a reluctance to turn people loose for fear of losing control. The highly structured system imposed by MACOMs and DA provide a risk free environment in which to operate. High performance installations, on the other hand, were

staffed by people who used regulations to their advantage and not as obstacles to action. Excellent Garrison Commanders know the upper limits of their authority and that provides them with the flexibility needed to accomplish their missions.

Stovepipe organizations exist throughout the Army and were created to manage a functional area vertically for economies of scale, or to centralize scarce expertise. Typical examples of formal stovepipes are the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES), Troop Support Agency (TSA), Department of Defense Dependent Schools (DODDS), Information Systems Command (ISC) and Health Services Command (HSC). All of these activities operate at the installation level providing essential soldier services but they do not report to or through the Installation Commander. Additionally, there are cases where the Army's BASOPS business is centrally controlled through similar, though informal, stovepipe organizations. Typical examples include Engineering and Housing (DEH); Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) activities; Procurement; Contracting; and the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO). Senior commanders in particular felt that stovepipe organizations significantly hindered their ability to take quick and effective action to resolve installation support problems or resolve other key issues. Excellent commanders have found methods (and they vary from installation to installation) to eliminate or circumvent stovepipes when they stand in the way of action. The most effective solutions have centered around team-building efforts to ensure the installation

components of stovepipes are part of the installation team. The Model Installation Program, in particular, with its emphasis on letting commanders run things their way, has great potential to provide relief to all commanders dedicated to the principles of excellent installations. (NOTE: As this study was being put to press, the Army announced worldwide implementation of the Model Installation Program effective 1 April 1987).

## **CHAPTER III**

### **CLOSE TO THE CUSTOMER**

The heart and soul of the Garrison mission is the support provided to the soldier and his family, whether on firing ranges or in the housing areas. It is universally recognized that successful service organizations cater to the needs and desires of the customers they serve by knowing what the customer wants. Successful Garrison Commanders see the need for input and feedback from the members of the community they serve and actively seek it. There are a variety of methods to achieve this end: town meetings, open door policies, commander sessions, mayoral meetings in housing areas, Armed Forces radio and television spots and other innovative ideas such as hot lines. Excellent installations have discovered that those methods which relate customer feedback to tangible, visible production results have the quickest synergistic payback.

One Garrison Commander requires all the principal members of his staff, down through Division Chief level, to get out of their offices and "knock on doors" at least one day a month. He also knocks on doors. This not only provides direct feedback but sends a clear signal to the customer that the Garrison Commander and his staff really care. When this occurs, the customer responds by getting involved and supporting, rather than complaining about, the way things are done. Low performance staffs were found to have a

"bunker" mentality and rationalized their inability to get out of the office by blaming it on excessive workloads and inadequate staffing. They had lost sight of the fact that the principal reason for their existence was to provide responsive and quality service to the soldiers, civilians and family members living and working on the installation. The high performers, on the other hand, found that the direct interface with the customers helped them to focus on the important issues (i.e., those which were important to the customer) and it afforded them an opportunity to view their organizations from the customer's perspective.

We found the greatest inhibitors to getting close to the customer to be (1) too much guidance from higher headquarters on both what to do and how to do it and (2) too many requests from higher headquarters for redundant and often previously submitted information and reports. One Garrison Commander reported that he had stopped sending reports to higher headquarters that seemed to serve no purpose. He stated that he reduced the reporting requirements by more than 30% as a result. The bottom line, then, is that garrison staffs spend too much time reacting to the demands from higher headquarters--time that could be much better spent by getting close to the customer.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **AUTONOMY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

More than any other pillar, this one has the greatest potential for successful implementation and effective results. Webster defines autonomy as "the quality or condition of being independent." Peters and Waterman define it as breaking the organization into small groups, or even individuals, and encouraging them to think independently and competitively. Put another way, autonomy means giving the individual(s) responsible for doing the job the tools with which to do it and the freedom of action to do the job his or her way. All commanders are responsible for accomplishing their assigned mission and are held accountable for their success or failure. Unfortunately, they are not always given the authority (someone higher up has to approve it), or the resources needed to do it. Excellent Garrison Commanders recognize that the days of "doing more with less" are here to stay and actively look for ways to do just that. They are willing to underwrite honest mistakes and allow subordinates to learn from them so as not to stifle initiative. Employees who are continually intimidated and fearful will never be innovative much less creative. Successful Garrison Commanders grab from above all the responsibility and authority they can, and, in turn, pass it on to their trusted subordinates to make decisions.

Perhaps the most widely publicized entrepreneurial endeavor in

recent months was the establishment of a contractor owned and operated mobile home park at Fort Ord, California. With more than 2,000 junior enlisted soldiers waiting for military housing in one of the highest cost areas in the country, the Director of Engineering and Housing developed an innovative scheme to get excellent housing quickly. Working with the Sacramento District Engineer, he arranged to lease 60 acres of installation land to a private developer for a nominal fee of \$1 for 25 years. The developer agreed to design, construct, operate and maintain an on-post community of 220 mobile homes which included 24 hour a day maintenance personnel, attractive landscaping, community center, athletic facilities, playgrounds, car wash bays, laundromats, bike trails and a camping area. And the entire project took only nine months from conception to occupancy!

Another innovative idea to solve critical administrative space problems was implemented in Yongsan, Korea, where office space had run out and there was no land for further expansion. The solution was to take the roof off some of the smaller one story buildings and add a second floor. The result was new office space at a considerably smaller unit cost than new construction from the ground up.

A third example was found at an installation where the lack of drop-in child care facilities for volunteer workers had rendered the Red Cross and Army Community service programs virtually ineffective. The Installation Commander directed that the child

care problem be solved, so the garrison staff found a way to purchase a "relocatable" building using DA funds. New Child Care doors opened eight months later. The new facility meets the Army's construction criteria for child care centers and fire and safety codes at a cost considerably less than a "permanent" structure in less than one fourth of the time. The installation volunteer program has been revitalized as a result.

Perhaps the greatest institutional advancement in fostering entrepreneurship was established in January 1984 when the Defense Department started the Model Installation Program. Mr. Bob Stone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) fathered this program and reports that three years of operating Model Installations have clearly shown that freeing people from over-regulation unleashes creativity and enthusiasm and increases defense capability by getting more out of each defense dollar spent. At installation level, all three services found the program to be just what they needed to actively move forward in their programs. Unfortunately, even though the most senior leadership of the Army support the Model Installation Program, there is much resistance to it at both the Army staff and MACOM levels. This stems partially from a lack of understanding of the program but primarily from a fear of "losing control." One very senior civilian on the Army Staff referred to the proponents of the Model Installation Program as the "madmen in DOD". Attitudes such as this which exist at the highest levels of the Army Staff must be overcome. It is hoped that the

**recent decision to implement the Model Installation Program Army-wide will serve as the catalyst to overcome this opposition.**

**Another new concept which has great potential but is still controversial is the Single Fund for all non-appropriated activities at the installation level. The Single Fund gives the local commander the flexibility to focus his locally generated non-appropriated funds on his installation's needs. Garrison commanders universally approved of the concept but expressed much concern about increasing involvement of MACOMS and DA in the utilization of Single Fund dollars. It is feared that the MACOMs and/or DA will direct redistribution of funds among installations and create a disincentive to entrepreneurship.**

## CHAPTER V

### PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH PEOPLE

Productivity through people requires two ingredients--motivation and training. Motivation can be instilled by creating in all employees an awareness that their best efforts are essential and that they will share in the rewards of the organization's successes. Hundreds of hard working people were found who want to do a good job, as well as a few who seem to feel that the Army exists for the purpose of providing them with a place of employment and a paycheck every two weeks. Unfortunately, many in both groups have not had the proper training to do their jobs as well as they could. Managers, both military and civilian, change jobs frequently and often are not in place long enough or are too busy with other things to adequately assess either their legitimate training needs or those of their subordinates. This point was driven home by the large number of computer terminals we saw which were not being used because of computer illiteracy. If technology is to be harnessed effectively, subordinates must be adequately trained to meet the expectations of their supervisors. More emphasis needs to be placed on the identification and provision of needed training.

Training shortfalls will never be overcome, however, until two more fundamental systems are changed. The first of these is the civilian personnel system. The commander must have more flexibility in moving spaces and faces in response to new missions and

functions. He must be able to train or replace those people who do not have the needed skills and hire those who do. He must be able to get rid of poor performers more quickly and easily. Installation managers in general were frustrated with their inability to effectively deal in a timely manner with the personnel problems associated with matching the workforce to their dynamic missions.

The second fundamental issue is the selection and training of senior military personnel to assume positions of leadership at the directorate or garrison level. Every Garrison Commander interviewed stated he did not feel adequately prepared to assume his duties as a Garrison Commander. Other than the Installation Management Course at Fort Lee, there are very few formal training courses offered by the Army on how to be a Garrison Commander. The Battalion and Brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC) at Fort Leavenworth has recently added some instruction on the subject of installation management to its curriculum. There are not, however, very many Garrison Commanders, especially in CONUS, who have commanded at the brigade level.

Opinions on installation management related courses at the directorate level were widely mixed. It seemed that the quality of courses fluctuated significantly and opinions of any particular course varied from person to person depending on which course(s) was (were) attended and when. The shortage of military personnel with experience in installation management has been exacerbated by the virtual elimination of military spaces from the BASOPS TDAs.

These spaces are the only means for junior officers to get installation management experience before assuming directorate or installation command duties. It appears that even more of these spaces are subject to cuts due to the recent Congressionally mandated officer reductions. The most successful officers were those who had prior experience working in the BASOPS arena. The Army does a great job of preparing officers to command divisions through successive assignments as company, battalion and brigade commanders. Unfortunately, a parallel structure does not exist in the installation management business. Interviewees felt that "growing our own" was the best way to develop competent leaders and managers in installation management.

A universally held perception, particularly among civilians who had been in one location for a long time, is that Garrison Commanders are retirement-bound Colonels who have reached the end of their career and are just waiting to retire. Although this is not true in all cases, there seems to be some validity to this perception. There is also a commonly held belief that officers assigned to work on garrison staffs are second class citizens. Although no statistical data was available for review, it is not believed in the field, based upon the interviews conducted, that an installation staff job background is conducive to promotion or command selection. One Lieutenant Colonel stated that he had been advised by his Division Commander not to take a job on the garrison staff if he ever wanted to command a battalion or be

**promoted to Colonel.**

**One of the major obstacles to productivity through people is the "we-they" attitude found common at the installation level, between installations and their MACOMs and between MACOMs and the DA staff. While not a new discovery, this "we-they" attitude is pervasive throughout the Army and stems in large part from the attempts by higher headquarters to micromanage their subordinate commands. For example, a good manager might streamline his organization and reduce manpower requirements from ten to six. The next CPO job audit or manpower survey from higher headquarters "rewards" this conscientious manager by downgrading his position even though he is doing the same mission as before, only more efficiently. This is a not too uncommon example of an institutional disincentive discouraging productivity through people. "We-they" is also fostered in a climate of diminishing dollars as people try to protect turf and resources. Ironically, idea sharing of successes is often viewed as a possible loss of resources in the competition between and among installations and commands. This creates an environment not conducive to cross-fertilization of excellence.**

**Excellent installations have commanders that get personally involved in the selection of quality installation directors. This often took general officer intervention and some good old fashioned Army tenacity to shake the good officers out of the personnel system. One installation of excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, does not**

resort to general officer horsepower to recruit quality staff directors but takes a more corporate approach. The names of a few officers are selected for interviews. These officers are invited, with their spouses, to come to Fort Leonard Wood for a couple of days. They are shown the post, its facilities and programs, and get a first hand feel for how things are run at Fort Leonard Wood. Everyone interviewed said that they sensed something "different" from the time they passed through the front gate for the first time. Interviewees are escorted by staff directors for several hours before being formally interviewed. The Installation Commander wants people that are both good and who want to come to Fort Leonard Wood. The result is a highly motivated staff of excellent officers who chose Fort Leonard Wood and who are dedicated to continuing its excellence in installation management. Regardless of the method, recruitment of good, experienced and motivated staff officers is as key to the excellence found on an installation as is the leadership of the Garrison Commander--perhaps even more so.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **HANDS-ON, VALUE-DRIVEN**

**Successful installation staffs are success oriented and hold the belief that they are the best. They are not driven by the statistics presented at periodic review and analysis sessions presented by the financial management experts, but by results. They strive to achieve the best possible results, even when they know that no one will notice. Low performing staffs seem more concerned about their performance appraisal and their next promotion. In general, these staffs are more concerned about the structure, resources and technical aspects of their organizations than about their achievements. They express the belief that only with proper organizational structure and desired resources can they achieve effective results.**

**On the other hand, successful Garrison Commanders understand that a difference exists between efficiency and effectiveness and do not allow the financial managers to run their installations. They invest full program responsibility in their program directors and allow them to manage their own resources consistent with the overall needs of the installation.**

**High performing staffs spoke well of their Garrison Commanders in terms of adequate (but not overwhelming) involvement in their programs and support when they had a problem. Problems**

between staff directorates as well as between the installation staff and tactical units were handled on an individual basis based upon the merits of the problem at hand. Commanders who always supported tactical commanders, right or wrong, fostered frustration in their own staff. The "second class citizenship" feeling of installation directors was higher on these installations where the "first team" tactical commanders could not make a mistake in the eyes of the installation or garrison commander. Successful installations have staffs that feel the Garrison Commander has his hand on the pulse of what they are doing but not a strangle hold. These high performance Garrison Commanders are a source of fair conflict resolution, strength and guidance to their staffs, not a source of unnecessary interference and aggravation.

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **STICK TO THE KNITTING**

Maintaining a focus on the mission of the installation does not seem to be a problem at most installations. The principal challenge is one of retaining people who know what they are doing and what needs to be done. This is more prevalent overseas than in CONUS. Commanders everywhere expressed great concern about the impact of personnel turbulence on effective installation operations. Military supervisors, by the very nature of the officer assignment and career development process, move frequently. The rotation of officers through installation staff positions overseas is particularly troublesome because of the high turnover rate of civilian supervisors as well. Civilians overseas are offered greater upward mobility opportunities than in CONUS and tend to "job hop" within and among installation organizations. Most folks know and understand why they need to "stick to the knitting," but personnel assignment policies (both military and civilian) inhibit them from doing so.

In recent years the Army leadership has fostered great expectations in the areas of quality of life and family support programs but has not resourced them to that level of expectation. Base operations activities have historically been the most vulnerable to manpower and budget cuts and any further cuts may

likely result in the reduction or elimination of programs which the Army community has been promised and expects. An inherent conflict exists between Department of the Army funded programs and policies and the concept of self-sufficiency of non-appropriated activities at the installation. The soldier and his family are being promised much but are having to pay for these benefits with what amounts to a regressive tax. To the soldier, this appears to be just another step in a long series of erosion of the benefits which once made the service an attractive career.

## **CHAPTER VIII**

### **SIMPLE FORM, LEAN STAFF**

A key element in most successful organizations is a basic simplicity of structure. Largeness generates complexity which in turn generates excessive bureaucracy for control. The Army has directed implementation of a structure to standardize and simplify installation and garrison organizations. This well intentioned Standard Installation Organization (SIO) is prescribed in AR 5-3, Installation Management. Second and third order effects and apparent conflicts with the good management practice of allowing a commander to organize so as to best accomplish his mission warrant a reconsideration of SIO.

For example, where the SIO is implemented at some installation levels, particularly OCONUS where installations are small, a SIO sub-element is so small that there is no staffing depth to maintain continuity of operations in times of normal personnel absences. This creates hollow organizations "a mile wide and an inch deep." Furthermore, a consensus was found that Army installations are significantly different in size, mission, local government and historical organization. It is extremely difficult to "cookie-cutter" SIO onto all installations world wide.

No subject was discussed more often by the interviewees than the Standard Installation Organization (SIO). Only one installation

visited appeared to have made an effort to fully comply with the new Army guidance on how installation staffs should be organized. Even there it was not working well. Compliance ranged from selective obedience to blatant disregard. The most commonly expressed areas of dissatisfaction were in the span of control imposed on the DPCA and in the level to which the organizational structure was defined (down to the division level in most cases). Placing the CPO under the DPCA was very controversial with commanders. Additionally, commanders and supervisors at all levels felt that SIO worked to the detriment of those installation activities under review for the Commercial Activities Program. Literal interpretation of AR 5-3 would mandate a traditional structure while clearly the Most Efficient Organization (MEO), to compete effectively, would argue for reduction of overhead by combining functional branches and divisions where possible. It appears that definitive guidance needs to be both articulated and understood.

The Army does, however, support the ideal of a lean staff at the garrison level; often so lean that it cannot adequately perform its daily peacetime missions let alone the critical mission of mobilization/transition to war. It is our collective opinion that sufficient manpower spaces exist within the Army to, with proper training and leadership, adequately perform the installation management functions. The problem is one of distribution. Headquarters elements appear to be staffed by too many people who generate

reports and requests for information which is not acted upon in a positive, problem solving manner when received. The installations dedicate a massive effort to answering higher headquarters that could be better used to service the customer. Almost without exception, Garrison Commanders expressed the belief that if they could focus on their assigned tasks instead of on the demands of their higher headquarters, they could successfully do their jobs with the assets currently allocated to them.

In addition to large headquarters elements are the layers of headquarters in installation management. In CONUS, installations report directly to Army MACOMs such as TRADOC and FORSCOM. In Europe, the typical installation is subordinate to a Division or equivalent tactical headquarters that may or may not deal much in installation business (most installation commanders are rated by these division commanders). Next in the chain is a headquarters called a USAREUR Major Command (UMC). UMCs are formally tasked and staffed for handling installation business and report to USAREUR in addition to having a tactical mission in wartime. Therefore an Installation Commander trying to program resources through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES) must go through two more higher, geographically separated headquarters than do most CONUS installations. USAREUR is staffed well enough to centrally request, process, prioritize, resource and follow up on the execution of individual installation line item initiatives, all being filtered through at least the UMC.

**This places the Installation Commander at the tail of a long line of  
staffs in the conduct of much of his primary business.**

## **CHAPTER IX**

### **SIMULTANEOUS LOOSE-TIGHT PROPERTIES**

"Loose-tight properties" means little more than firm central direction with maximum individual autonomy. It means encouraging innovation and individualism with a set of well defined goals, objectives and values while having the discipline to function effectively within such a framework. At the installation level, this characteristic was found to be quite evident among the high performing staffs and absent at the other end of the performance spectrum. Commanders expressed great frustration because of attempts by stovepipes and higher headquarters to control not only results but the execution process as well.

Some installation commanders felt too tightly controlled when commanders at higher headquarters placed program control of informal stovepipe programs such as DEH OMA maintenance and repair accounts or morale support non-appropriated fund accounts with their principal staff. We found that this was necessary in some cases to enable the higher headquarters commanders to monitor and assist installations that were slow in obligating program funds. Failure to obligate the command's annual program funds usually results in erosion of future program funding. Commanders have no problem with being told what the expected results are but expect to be given the authority to determine the

**best manner in which to accomplish missions on their post.**

**Perhaps one of the most evident and exciting values exhibited at the highest performing installations was the atmosphere of risk taking. These commanders and their staffs had a clear focus on who their customer is, what his needs are and had strong convictions on how to best serve them. If they were not given the latitude to function and experiment, they took it. They firmly believed that it is easier to seek forgiveness than permission--and seldom found a need to.**

## **CHAPTER X**

### **MOBILIZATION/TRANSITION TO WAR**

**Findings on installation preparation for war and capabilities of executing mobilization/transition to war missions were fairly consistant throughout the Army.** Generally, (1) plans do exist, (2) staff directors are familiar with the provisions of these plans, (3) plans are based upon what the installation staffs believe to be unreliable/unrealistic planning requirements from sources outside their installations, (4) plans are not being taken seriously enough to allocate adequate resources for their eventual fully successful implementation, (5) plans are being exercised at least in part if not in total, (6) installation staffs feel that they will find some way to accomplish mobilization/ transition to war plans if they are ever really needed and (7) mobilization/transition to war planning is "back burner" to other, more immediate problems being faced by installation commanders and staffs. USAREUR, EUSA and USARJ have recently placed special emphasis on transition to war planning and exercises, but day to day crises at the installation level continue to subordinate transition to war plans to more current, real life problems at the installation.

## **CHAPTER XI**

### **STATEMENT OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **C-O-N-C-L-U-S-I-O-N-S**

**A BIAS FOR ACTION**--Garrison Commanders and their staffs don't know the limits of their authority and are therefore not taking action at the installation level as much as they could under current Army policy. Stovepipes are often obstructions to the Garrison Commander's ability to take action on his/her installation.

**CLOSE TO THE CUSTOMER**--Many installation staffs are not making adequate efforts to meet and know their customers. Excessive reports from installations to higher headquarters produce nothing positive for the installation and take valuable customer service time away from the installation staff.

**AUTONOMY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP**--Not all Garrison Commanders are given the three things he/she needs for autonomy and entrepreneurship: responsibility, authority and resources. All, however, are held accountable for results. The Model Installation Program is an overwhelming success in the field. The Single Fund initiative is relatively well received in the field and Garrison Commanders and their staffs are optimistic about the future successes of the Single Fund concept, provided they can continue to control it.

**PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH PEOPLE**--Installation management staffs at all levels are lacking in adequate training to manage at the "excellence" level. Due to the inflexibility and bureaucracy of the civilian personnel system, installation managers are having difficulty in the timely matching of qualified, motivated personnel to their dynamic mission changes. The Army officer career development pattern does not effectively assign officers at the junior level to installation positions which adequately prepare them for later assignment to director and Garrison Commander positions. Installation management schools in the eyes of the attendees are not consistent in their quality and/or relevancy of instruction. Formal schooling will enhance but not replace the training problem. There is no substitute for hand-on experience. Personnel assigned to installation staffs feel that they have been taken out of the mainstream of Army promotion competitiveness and are viewed and treated as "second class citizens." A "we-they" attitude exists in the field among installations and between installations and their supporting headquarters. There is a direct correlation between high performing installations and the involvement (but not over-involvement) of the Garrison Commander.

**HANDS ON, VALUE DRIVEN**--High performing installations have a self image of themselves as being among the best installations in the Army. High performing installations allow their program managers to control with appropriate authority their programs. They are not micromanaged by the Garrison Commander or higher

headquarters. Motivated and effective installation staff members have a good opinion of the fairness, competency, support and involvement of their Garrison Commander.

**STICK TO THE KNITTING**--Focus on installation business is complicated by the job turbulence of people assigned to conduct installation business.

**SIMPLE FORM, LEAN STAFF**--The Standard Installation Organization is misunderstood and/or opposed in the field. Army wide personnel manpower assets are adequate to staff installations properly if headquarters staffs are reduced and the resulting manpower given to the installations for primary mission accomplishment.

**SIMULTANEOUS LOOSE-TIGHT PROPERTIES**--High performance installations are told what to do by their higher headquarters and are not restricted on how to do it. Over regulation is counter-productive to high performance and excellence.

**MOBILIZATION/TRANSITION TO WAR**--Plans exist and are being exercised on a minimal basis. Lack of resourcing reflects lack of Army interest in earnest planning and preparation for mobilization/transition to war. As a result, planning is not a high priority at the installation level. Planning criteria from outside the installation is considered unreliable/unrealistic. Most installation staffs feel that in the time of real emergency some way of accomplishing the mission will be found.

## **R-E-C-O-M-M-E-N-D-A-T-I-O-N-S**

**A BIAS FOR ACTION**--The Army should change its historical focus on what subordinates can not do and focus on what they can do. Stovepipe commands should be eliminated where possible and if not eliminated be made to report through and be accountable to the Garrison Commander.

**CLOSE TO THE CUSTOMER**--Command emphasis must be placed upon installation staffs by formal and informal means to get to know their customers. An Army wide assessment of the requirement for reports should eliminate as many existing reports as possible. Procedures for control of report requirement generation should be reviewed and made more effective in the field.

**AUTONOMY AND ENTERPRENEURSHIP**--Commanders should evaluate their leadership style to ensure that power down in responsibility, authority and resources is taking place so their subordinates have a true opportunity to search for excellence in their jobs. Now that the Model Installation Program has been expanded to all installations in the Army, it must be fully supported at all levels of the Army, not just the senior leadership. The Single Fund initiative should continue with care being given not to let higher headquarters dabble in allocation of funds at the installation level.

**PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH PEOPLE**--More care must be taken at all levels to adequately assess personnel training needs and meet those needs with timely training. Within legal constraints, the

**Garrison Commander must be given as much authority over hiring and firing of civilian personnel as possible. Junior Officer manpower allocations should be retained within the directorate TDA's to allow for developmental assignments of officers. The Army should retain military officers in directorate level positions--especially those which have a direct interface with the soldier and his family (DPCA, DOL, DEH). Greater care should be given at Army installation management schools in quality, consistency and updating of course material to cover germane topics. Garrison commander positions should be command slots filled by the current command board process. Garrison Commanders should be selected from among all officers having successfully held an installation staff directorate position for a period of time equivalent to the current battalion/brigade command tenure policy.**

**HANDS ON, VALUE DRIVEN--None**

**STICK TO THE KNITTING--Where possible, every effort should be made to minimize military and civilian personnel turbulence on installations. An incentive and/or disincentive program might be developed to address turbulence.**

**SIMPLE FORM, LEAN STAFF--The intent and implementation of the Standard Installation Program needs further explanation in the field. It should also be reconsidered in light of the uniqueness of OCONUS installations and various mission oriented installations that simply do not fit one of the standard installation organizations. Removal of unnecessary layers and functions from intermediate**

headquarters throughout the Army will allow for the reduction of headquarters staffs and a return of these manpowers spaces to the installations. Even considering the geographical dispersion and number of installations involved, USAREUR should consider streamlining or eliminating the installation support staff at either the USAREUR or UMC level and returning the manpower savings to Installation Commanders for utilization in the primary performance of the installation missions.

SIMULTANEOUS LOOSE-TIGHT PROPERTIES--Regulations that prescribe how things are to be done should be eliminated where possible and those that cannot be eliminated should have provisions for exceptions by installation commanders.

MOBILIZATION/TRANSITION TO WAR--The Army Staff must re-evaluate the relative priority of "mobilization/transition to war planning" and the attendant programming of resources. Unless a higher priority is assigned by the Army staff and resources are forthcoming, it is unlikely that any substantial change in the quality of "mobilization/transition to war planning" at the installation level will occur.

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68. Maddox, William T., MAJ (P). Executive Officer, 136th Engineer Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood. Personal Interview. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri: 9 March 1987.
69. Mann, Elmer, CDR, USN. Deputy Base Commander, Kings Bay Trident Facility. Personal Interview. Kings Bay, Georgia: 29 December 1986.
70. Masser, Thomas J., LCDR, USN. Supply and Fiscal Officer, Yokosuka Naval Base. Personal Interview. Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan: 23 January 1987.
71. Matthews, James. Model Installation Program Coordinator, 20th Support Group, Taegu. Personal Interview. Taegu, Korea: 23 January 1987.
72. McCoy, Kenneth M., COL, USAF. Commander, Osan Air Base. Personal Interview. Osan Air Base, Korea: 22 January 1987.
73. McKay, Tom. Resource Manager, Karlsruhe Military Community. Personal Interview. Karlsruhe, West Germany: 21 January 1987.
74. Mergner, George F., COL, AC of S, Resource Management, USFK. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 20 January 1987.
75. Meyers, Martin, MAJ. Director of Engineering and Housing.

**Giessen Military Community. Personal Interview. Giessen,  
West Germany: 19 January 1987.**

- 76. Mikale, Dennis M., LTC. Director of Personnel and  
Community Activities, USARJ. Personal Interview. Camp  
Zama, Japan: 22 January 1987.**
- 77. Mills, Hugh, LTC. Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization  
and Security. Fort Leavenworth. Personal Interview. Fort  
Leavenworth, Kansas: 6 February 1987.**
- 78. Miller, John. Office of the DC of S, Engineer, USAREUR and  
Seventh Army. Personal Interview. Heidelberg, West  
Germany: 23 January 1987.**
- 79. Minor, Richard, COL. Chief, Force Development Division, AC  
of S, G-3, EUSA. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 20  
January 1986.**
- 80. Moses, Patrick, CPT, USA. Deputy Director of Material and  
Services, 20th Support Group, Taegu. Personal Interview.  
Taegu, Korea: 23 January 1987.**
- 81. Moles, John L., LTC. Director of Engineering and Housing.  
Fort Leavenworth. Personal Interview. Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas: 6 February 1987.**
- 82. Olson, Hardin L., MG. Chief of Staff, USPK. Personal  
Interview. Washington, D.C.: 17 December 1986.**
- 83. Olson, Hardin L., MG. Chief of Staff, USPK. Personal  
Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 20 January 1987.**
- 84. Owen, Dean M., COL. Garrison Commander, Fort Lewis.  
Personal Interview. Fort Lewis, Washington: 16 December  
1986.**

85. Panyik, Robert J., MAJ, USAF. Chief of Family Support Center, 475th Air Base Wing, Yokota Air Base. Personal Interview. Yokota Air Base, Japan: 21 January 1987.
86. Parker, Grace. Office of the DC of S, Resource Management, USAREUR and Seventh Army. Personal Interview. Heidelberg, West Germany: 23 January 1987.
87. Patten, Elizabeth. Office of the DC of S, Resource Management, USAREUR and Seventh Army. Personal Interview. Heidelberg, West Germany: 23 January 1987.
88. Pearson, William P., CDR, USN. Deputy Director of Public Works, Kings Bay Trident Facility. Personal Interview. Kings Bay, Georgia: 30 December 1986.
- 89 Pennell, William H., COL. Director of Personnel and Community Activities, Fort Leonard Wood. Personal Interview. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri: 9 March 1987.
90. Philpott, James M. Assistant DC of S, Resource Management, USARJ. Personal Interview. Camp Zama, Japan: 22 January 1987.
91. Polzak, L. A. Chief, Management Division, AC of S, Resource Management, USFK. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 20 February 1987.
92. Prince, George R., Jr. Deputy Commander, Facilities Engineer Activity, Korea. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 20 January 1987.
93. Ragan, James H., LTC, USAF. Chief of Public Affairs, 475th Air Base Wing, Yokota Air Base. Personal Interview. Yokota Air Base, Japan: 21 January 1987.

94. Ranalli, Marcello A., LCDR, USN. Assistant Director of Public Works, Kings Bay Trident Facility. Personal Interview. Kings Bay, Georgia: 30 December 1986.
95. Ray, James W., LTC. Director of Plans, Training and Security, USARJ. Personal Interview. Camp Zama, Japan: 22 January 1987.
96. Reed, Stephen. Mayor of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Personal Interview. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: 27 October 1986.
97. Reth, Thomas B., COL. Director of Engineering and Housing, Fort Leonard Wood. Personal Interview. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri: 9 March 1987.
98. Riffey, John, LTC. AC of S, Services, 19th Support Command, EUSA. Personal Interview. Taegu, Korea: 23 January 1987.
99. Rogers, John L., LTC. Deputy Community Commander, Karlsruhe Military Community. Personal Interview. Karlsruhe, West Germany, 22 January 1987.
100. Rossow, Al, COL. AC of S, J-1, USFK. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 20 January 1987.
101. Ruff, Edwin, LTC. Director of Engineering and Housing, Frankfurt Military Community. Personal Interview. Frankfurt, West Germany: 20 January 1987.
102. Saint, Crosby E., LTG. Commander, Fort Hood. Personal Interview. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 18 December 1986.
103. Salinas, Gilberto, Jr., LTC, USAF. Chief of Civil Engineering, 475th Air Base Wing, Yokota Air Base. Personal Interview. Yokota Air Base, Japan: 21 January 1987.

- 104. Santoni, Felix A., BG, USAR. Commander, USAR Forces-Puerto Rico and Commander, 7581st US Army Garrison. Personal Interview. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 26 February 1987.**
- 105. Schaler, Michael D., COL. Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley. Personal Interview. Fort Riley, Kansas: 5 February 1987.**
- 106. Schraeder, Raymond, MAJ. Chief, Management Studies Branch, Management Division, AC of S, Resource Management, USFK. Personal Interviews. Yongsan, Korea: 19-23 January 1987.**
- 107. Scott, James T., MAJ. Director of Engineering and Housing, Camp Zama. Personal Interview. Camp Zama, Japan: 2 January 1987.**
- 108. Selby, Theodore J., CDR, USN. Supply Officer, Kings Bay Trident Facility. Personal Interview. Kings Bay, Georgia: 30 December 1986.**
- 109. Sheffield, James D., MAJ. Director of Logistics, Camp Zama. Personal Interview. Camp Zama, Japan: 22 January 1987.**
- 110. Smith, E. C., LTC. Deputy Commander, 20th Support Group, Taegu. Personal Interview. Taegu, Korea: 23 January 1987.**
- 111. Smith, Paul C., LTC. Director of Material and Services, 501st Support Group, Yongsan. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 21 January 1987.**
- 112. Speidel, Richard G., LTC. Deputy Commander, 501st Support Group, Yongsan. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 21 January 1987.**

113. Stewart, James W., Logistics Management Specialist, Directorate of Logistics, Fort Leonard Wood. Personal Interview. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri: 9 March 1987.
114. Stoker, Darrell J., MAJ. Chief, Services and Installations Operations Division, 19th Support Command, EUSA. Personal Interview. Taegu, Korea: 23 January 1987.
115. Stone, Robert A. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations), Department of Defense. Personal Interview. Washington, D.C.: 6 November 1986.
116. Strawhorne, Suzanne. Director of Resource Management, Baumholder Military Community. Personal Interview. Baumholder, West Germany: 21 January 1987.
117. Summitt, Robert L., RA, USNR. Assistant Force Medical Officer, Area 2. Personal Interview. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 26 February 1987.
118. Taber, R.G., LTC. Director of Personnel and Administration, 501st Support Group, USFK. Personal Interview. Yongson, Korea: 21 January 1987.
119. van Loben Sels, James W., MG. Commander, Fort Leonard Wood. Personal Interview. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri: 9 March 1987.
120. Van Sickie, James, LTC. Director of Engineering and Housing, Baumholder Military Community. Personal Interview. Baumholder, West Germany: 21 January 1987.
121. Vorhees, R. R., LtCol, USAF. Deputy Base Civil Engineer, Osan Air Base. Personal Interview. Osan Air Base, Korea: 21 January 1987.
122. Wahl, Robert G., Director of Plans Training, and Security,

**501st Support Group, Yongsan. Personal Interview.  
Yongsan, Korea: 21 January 1987.**

- 123. Waldron, Larry T. Comptroller, 501st Support Group,  
Yongsan. Personal Interview. Yongsan, Korea: 21 January  
1987.**
- 124. Walker, Jack E. Executive Assistant to the Garrison  
Commander, Fort Leavenworth. Personal Interview. Fort  
Leavenworth, Kansas: 6 February 1987.**
- 125. Watts, Ronald L., MG. Chief of Staff, FORSCOM. Personal  
Interview. Washington, D.C.: 15 January 1987.**
- 126. Wells, James L., CAPT, USN. Director of Public Works, Kings  
Bay Trident Facility. Personal Interview. Kings Bay,  
Georgia: 30 December 1986.**
- 127. Werner, Gerald C., COL. Director of Resource Management,  
Fort Leonard Wood. Personal Interview. Fort Leonard  
Wood, Missouri, 9 March 1987.**
- 128. Wheeler, David L., LTC. Director of Logistics, Fort  
Leavenworth, Personal Interview. Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas: 6 February 1987.**
- 129. White, Daryl, AC of S, Resource Management, USAREUR and  
Seventh Army. Personal Interview. Heidelberg, West  
Germany: 23 January 1987.**
- 130. Whitfield, Steven, LTC. Director of Engineering and Housing,  
Fort Riley. Personal Interview. Fort Riley, Kansas: 5  
February 1987.**
- 132. Williams, Lurita. Civilian Personnel Officer, Fort  
Leavenworth. Personal Interview. Fort Leavenworth,  
Kansas: 6 February 1987.**

- 133. Wilson, Bruce L., COL. Deputy Community Commander, Hanau Military Community. Personal Interview. Hanau, West Germany: 22 January 1987.**
- 134. Workman, Mike. Director of Personnel and Community Activities, Frankfurt Military Community. Personal Interview. Frankfurt, West Germany: 20 January 1987.**
- 135. Yankie, Nancy C., LTJG, USN. Security Officer, Yokosuka Naval Base. Personal Interview. Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan: 23 January 1987.**
- 136. Young, Larry. Deputy Director of Resource Management, Fort Riley. Personal Interview. Fort Riley, Kansas: 5 February 1987.**

## **APPENDIX 1-LIST OF INSTALLATIONS STUDIED**

**Camp Mercer, Korea**  
**Camp Zama, Japan**  
**Fort Hood, Texas**  
**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**  
**Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri**  
**Fort Lewis, Washington**  
**Fort McPherson, Georgia**  
**Fort Riley, Kansas**  
**Bad Kreuznach Military Community, West Germany**  
**Baumholder Military Community, West Germany**  
**Frankfurt Military Community, West Germany**  
**Gießen Military Community, West Germany**  
**Hanau Military Community, West Germany**  
**Karlsruhe Military Community, West Germany**  
**Kings Bay Trident Facility, Georgia**  
**Neu-Ulm Military Community, West Germany**  
**Osan Air Base, Korea**  
**Taegu, Korea**  
**Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan**  
**Yokota Air Base, Japan**  
**Yongsan, Korea**  
**Rhein Main Air Base, West Germany**